On 22 July 1921, in the mountainous terrain of northeastern Morocco, the Spanish Empire suffered its most devastating military defeat in modern history, the Battle of Annual. Fought between the Spanish Army and the Riffian Berbers during the Rif War, this catastrophic loss left over 13,000 Spanish soldiers dead and marked the beginning of a political and military crisis that would shake the foundations of Spain’s colonial ambitions and monarchy.
Spain’s involvement in Morocco began centuries earlier, with the capture of Melilla in 1497 and eventual acquisition of Ceuta from Portugal. These Mediterranean coastal cities remained under Spanish control for centuries, and still are today. However, Spain’s influence in the interior was minimal, until the European colonial powers divided Africa in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
During the Scramble for Africa in 1884, when European powers divided the continent among themselves, France emerged as the dominant colonial force in North Africa. To avoid direct conflict, France and Spain reached a compromise: under the Treaty of Fez in 1912.
While France controlled central Morocco, Spain was left to administer the more rugged and rebellious northern territory.
The treaty also granted the concession for exploitation of the iron mines of Mount Uixan to the Spanish Rif Mines Company, which was also given permission to build a railroad to connect the mines with Melilla.
Spain’s broader mission was to impose colonial authority over the Riffian Berbers, Indigenous mountain communities with a long-standing tradition of resisting foreign rule.
By 1921, Spanish forces in the north, had begun an aggressive military push from Melilla into the interior of the Rif region, home to fiercely independent and armed Berber tribes.
These Indigenous peoples, known collectively as the Riffian Berbers, had lived in the Maghreb long before Arab conquest and European colonialism. They were accustomed to the rugged terrain and deeply resistant to foreign domination. Their social structure was decentralized, but they were bound by tribal alliances, traditions, and a shared hostility to outside rule.
The Spanish campaign was spearheaded by General Manuel Fernández Silvestre, a bold and impulsive officer who had rapidly expanded Spanish territory in the region. Backed by King Alfonso XIII, who viewed him as a favorite, Silvestre was determined to subdue the Rif and extend Spain’s military footprint toward Al Hoceima Bay, a strategic coastal point.
In early 1921, Silvestre launched an aggressive offensive from the Spanish-held city of Melilla, pushing approximately 130 kilometers into Rifian territory. But the rapid advance lacked proper planning. No fortified positions were built, water supplies were not secured, and communication lines were thin or nonexistent.
The newly occupied areas were lined with small, vulnerable outposts called blocaos, each manned by as few as 12–20 soldiers. Isolated, understaffed, and poorly equipped, these posts were scattered across mountainous terrain, far from support or reinforcements.
Silvestre underestimated the local resistance. His belief that the Riffians were too disorganized to mount a major challenge would prove fatal.
Opposing the Spanish was a coalition of fiercely independent Riffian Berber tribes led by Abd el-Krim, a former translator and civil servant who became the architect of one of the most effective indigenous resistance movements in colonial Africa. The Riffians, indigenous to North Africa and predating Arab influence in the region, organized under el-Krim’s leadership to expel the Spanish from their lands.
El-Krim’s forces launched a coordinated campaign against the fragile Spanish front. On 1 June 1921, they captured Mount Abarrán, inflicting early losses on the Spanish. By mid-July, they besieged the outpost of Igueriben. The Spanish defenders, suffering from thirst and under constant artillery fire, were forced to retreat under heavy fire, only 33 of the 300 men survived.
The Disaster of Annual
With the outposts collapsing and water supplies dwindling, Silvestre made the fateful decision to retreat from Annual on 22 July. Around 5,000 Spanish troops began the withdrawal, but chaos quickly ensued.
What should have been a controlled retreat turned into one of the worst defeat in European colonial history. Around 5,000 Spanish troops, mostly poorly trained conscripts from mainland Spain, attempted to march back to Melilla. But morale was low, ammunition was scarce, and the chain of command had disintegrated.
Desertion spread quickly. Moroccan auxiliary forces, native police, and allied tribes switched sides, abandoning the retreating column. Without flank protection or rear guards, the Spanish soldiers were exposed.
What followed was not a retreat, but a massacre. The Riffians, numbering around 3,000 fighters, attacked relentlessly. Under the intense summer heat and enemy fire, the Spanish line collapsed. Soldiers were cut down, captured, or fled in panic.
General Silvestre vanished during the battle. His remains were never officially recovered, though some reports claim his body was later identified on the battlefield.
Survivors fell back to Monte Arruit, a heavily fortified base where General Felipe Navarro tried to regroup. With no supplies and no relief in sight, the base surrendered on 9 August. But the Riffians did not honor the terms. They massacred 3,000 surrendering troops and captured over 500 soldiers and civilians. These prisoners were held for 18 months before Spain paid a massive ransom of four million pesetas for their release.
The defeat at Annual triggered a total collapse of Spanish military control in northeastern Morocco. Over 130 spanish positions were abandoned or overrun as the Riffians advanced. By late August, Spain had lost nearly all the territory it had gained since 1909.
Official figures reported to the Spanish Parliament put the death toll at 13,192, including both Spanish and Moroccan colonial forces. Some estimates suggest the number could be as high as 22,000, with only a small fraction of the deployed soldiers surviving the initial onslaught and retreat.
The Spanish Army also lost enormous amounts of equipment: including thousands rifles, machine guns, and animals for transport. Abd el-Krim later said, “In just one night, Spain supplied us with all the equipment we needed to carry on a big war.”
The loss of over 13,000 soldiers sent shockwaves through Spain, triggering a national scandal and political crisis. An official inquiry, the Expediente Picasso, revealed widespread incompetence and corruption but was ultimately suppressed by political elites to avoid assigning blame.
The military humiliation led to a collapse in public trust. King Alfonso XIII came under fire for backing Silvestre, and unrest within the military and the public intensified. By 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera seized power in a coup, establishing a military dictatorship. King Alfonso would abdicate just eight years later, as the monarchy lost its grip.
In the wake of its defeat, Spain retreated to just three coastal strongholds: Ceuta, Tetouan, and Melilla. However, the Riffian momentum eventually turned against them. In 1925, Abd el-Krim pushed into French-occupied Morocco, prompting a powerful joint French-Spanish military response. A combined force of over 250,000 troops, supported by large numbers of aircraft, artillery and chemical weapons, launched a full-scale assault on the Rif.
By May 1926, facing overwhelming force, Abd el-Krim surrendered. He was exiled to Réunion and later settled in Cairo, where he remained a symbolic figure of anti-colonial resistance until his death.
To this day, the Battle of Annual remains the single largest and deadliest military defeat in Spain’s modern history. No other engagement has cost the country so many lives in such a short span of time, nor so thoroughly exposed the vulnerabilities of its military and colonial ambitions.
Sources:
https://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/Modern/BattleOfAnnual
https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/violenceinafrica/sample-page/the-scramble-for-africa/
